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In State v. McLaughlin,' the Indiana Court of Appeals was con-
fronted with a fourth amendment issue arising from the defendant's
motion to suppress evidence connected with his arrest at a roadblock
for driving while intoxicated. The defendant driver had been arrested
after failing a breathalyzer test administered at a police roadblock estab-
lished "primarily for the purpose of detecting and apprehending drunk
drivers." ' 2 In other words, the defendant had not been stopped primarily
because he had aroused suspicion; the roadblock indiscriminately led
to the gathering of the evidence.
The court of appeals employed the balancing test used by the United
States Supreme Court in Brown v. Texas.3 Under this balancing test,
the reasonableness of a seizure upon suspicion not focused on a particular
individual - as opposed to a situation where an individual is stopped
because he or she has aroused suspicion - requires weighing "the gravity
of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the
seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference
with individual liberty." 4
For guidance in further explicating the balancing test in Brown, the
court turned to a decision of the Kansas Supreme Court.5 The Kansas
court had, through its examination of a number of Supreme Court cases
in various contexts, arrived at a list of thirteen explicitly non-exhaustive
factors to be weighed somehow in the balance. 6 The factors listed in
State v. Deskins include:
(1) The degree of discretion, if any, left to the officer in the
field; (2) the location designated for the roadblock; (3) the time
*Bigelow Fellow and Instructor of Law, University of Chicago. A.B., University
of Virginia, 1972; Ph.D. Indiana University, 1976; J.D.; Indiana University School of
Law-Indianapolis, 1982.
'471 N.E.2d 1125 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984), transfer denied, May 3, 1985. McLaughlin
has been quoted extensively in a recent New Jersey decision, State v. Kirk, 493 A.2d
1271, 1280-82 (N.J. Super. 1985).
21d. at 1129. The seizure occurred prior to any individualized suspicion falling upon
the defendant. Id. at 1128-29.
3443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979). Brown did not involve a drunk driving roadblock stop,
and no other United States Supreme Court case has addressed the major issue raised in
McLaughlin.
11d. This test shares its obviously utilitarian foundations with the procedural due
process test enunciated in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976).
'State v. Deskins, 234 Kan. 529, 673 P.2d 1174 (1983).
1Id. at 542, 673 P.2d at 1185.
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and duration of the roadblock; (4) standards set by superior
officers; (5) advance notice to the public at large; (6) advance
warning to the individual approaching motorist; (7) maintenance
of safety conditions; (8) degree of fear or anxiety generated by
the mode of operation; (9) average length of time each motorist
is detained; (10) physical factors surrounding the location, type
and method of operation; (11) the availability of less intrusive
methods for combating the problem; (12) the degree of effec-
tiveness of the procedure; and (13) any other relevant circum-
stances which might bear upon the test. 7
While it is clear that, in Indiana, the reasonableness of the search
does not require that every factor be found favorable to the state, 8 the
relative weight to be accorded each individual factor was left largely
unspecified. The court of appeals did indicate in dicta that extreme or
"unbridled discretion" of field officers, as opposed to supervisory of-
ficers, would by itself dictate a finding of the unreasonableness of the
search. 9 Field discretion, however, is probably not unique in its potential
decisiveness. For example, unreasonably and unnecessarily lengthy de-
tentions of motorists subject to no individualized suspicion would sim-
ilarly dictate a finding of unreasonableness.10
If certain of the thirteen specified factors have the potential to be
individually decisive of the case adversely to the state, it is arguable
that others do not. The mere availability of less intrusive alternative
procedures may be one example. The Supreme Court has recently ob-
served in a somewhat different context that
[a] creative judge engaged in post hoc evaluation of police
conduct can almost always imagine some alternative means by
which the objectives of the police might have been accomplished.
But "[tihe fact that the protection of the public might, in the
abstract, have been accomplished by 'less intrusive' means does
not, in itself, render the search unreasonable." The question is
not simply whether some other alternative was available, but
whether the police acted unreasonably in failing to recognize or
to pursue it."
'Id., quoted in State v. McLaughlin, 471 N.E.2d 1125, 1135-36 (Ind. Ct. App.
1984), transfer denied, May 3, 1985.
'See 471 N.E.2d at 1136.
1Id. (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979)).
I°See United States v. Sharpe, 105 S. Ct. 1568, 1575 (1985).




Without further elaboration of the weighing process, the court in
McLaughlin went on to consider the thirteen factors in the context of
the three-part balancing test in Brown. 12 The court in effect undertook
an elaborate balancing-within-a-balancing. The court concluded that
Despite the gravity of the public concern for identifying and
apprehending drunk drivers and the moderately low level of
interference with individual liberty occasioned by the roadblock
procedure, the state failed to present any evidence that the
roadblock procedure advanced the public interest to a greater
degree than would have been achieved by traditional methods
of drunk-driving law enforcement, which are to be preferred
because they are based upon a requirement of individualized
suspicion. 13
McLaughlin was thus in a way an easy case. The state raised only
a detection-and-apprehension interest, and defaulted on its burden of
showing the superiority of the roadblock procedures in this regard. The
case therefore provides little guidance for future cases in which some
quantum of evidence is presented, or in which long or short-term de-
terrence of drunk driving is the public interest alleged, or where a more
easily demonstrable, but perhaps less crucial, public interest is raised,
such as the expression of public concern over drunk driving, or the
calling of community attention to the drunk driving problem.
The court in McLaughlin began its three-part analysis by finding
the public concern served, or purportedly served, by the seizure to be
"very grave indeed."' 4 The court took judicial notice of the extent of
'"See 471 N.E.2d at 1135-36.
"Id. at 1141. This formulation of the court's holding is reassuring in that it explicitly
recognizes that the proper inquiry is not into "the degree of effectiveness of the procedure,"
see infra text accompanying note 57, but into the relative effectiveness of the particular
roadblock technique, as contrasted with the efficacy of the available alternatives. The
formulation is less satisfactory insofar as it may suggest that detection and apprehension
of drunk drivers, as opposed to deterrence of drunk driving, must be the primary state
interest weighed in the balance; it must be remembered, however, that the state in
McLaughlin did not allege or attempt to show a deterrence effect. Id. at 1129. It should
also be noted that both Brown and McLaughlin appear to equate "public concern" with
"the public interest." See Brown, 443 U.S. at 50-51; McLaughlin, 471 N.E.2d at 1135,
1141. Wherever the court is to look to determine the public interest, it is at least arguable
that it may look to other sources to attune itself to public concerns. Nor is it clear that
every public concern is fully consistent with the public interest, in the sense of being
either well-advised or constitutionally legitimate.
"471 N.E.2d at 1137.
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the drunk driving problem, 5 and cited Indiana legislative responses along
with judicial recognition of the magnitude of the problem.' 6
The court entered into its detailed discussion of the thirteen factors
in examining the second element of the Brown balancing test - the degree
to which the particular roadblock seizure advanced the public concerns
involved.' 7 The court's crucial conclusion in this regard was that "[tihe
'While one court has, in State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Court of State, 136 Ariz.
1, 5, 663 P.2d 992, 996 (1983) (en banc), declined to take comparable judicial notice,
the McLaughlin court's willingness to do so seems sound. See id. at 8 n.2, 663 P.2d at
999 n.2 (Feldman, J., specially concurring); State v. Superior Court, 143 Ariz. 45, 48,
691 P.2d 1073, 1076 (1984) (en banc) (minimizing the import of Ekstrom in this and
other respects).
"471 N.E.2d at 1136 (citing South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983), along
with Ruge v. Kovach, 467 N.E.2d 673, 681 (Ind. 1984), in addition to recent Indiana
statutory changes).
'471 N.E.2d at 1137. The second and third Brown criteria, which subsume most
of the thirteen factors discussed originally in Deskins and adopted in McLaughlin, are
treated variously in the increasing number of state cases involving intoxication roadblocks.
For a discussion of a number of these cases, which continue to reach divergent results
on varying facts and states of the record, see Note, The Constitutionality of Roadblocks
Conducted to Detect Drunk Drivers in Indiana, 17 IND. L. REV. 1065 (1984). See also
Annot., 37 A.L.R.4TH 10 (1985) (collecting routine roadblock cases without limitation to
drunk driving stops, but already dated until supplemented). A sampling of additional
recent law review articles includes: Note, Curbing the Drunk Driver under the Fourth
Amendment: The Constitutionality of Roadblock Seizures, 71 GEO. L.J. 1457 (1983);
Comment, The Prouse Dicta: From Random Stops to Sobriety Checkpoints?, 20 IDAHO
L. REV. 127 (1984); Comment, Filling in the Blanks after Prouse: A New Standard for
the Drinking-Driving Roadblock, 20 LAND & WATER L. REV. 241 (1985); Comment,
Sobriety Checkpoint Roadblocks: Are They Constitutional in Light of Delaware v. Prouse?,
28 ST. Louis U.L.J. 813 (1984); Comment, The Fourth Amendment Roadblock Against
Detecting Drunk Drivers, 18 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 475 (1984). Probably the most thoughtful
of the articles not dealing specifically with Indiana law is Grossman, Sobriety Checkpoints:
Roadblocks to Fourth Amendment Protections, 12 AM. J. CRIM. L. 123 (1984).
A number of the cases in this area are too recent to have been included in the
McLaughlin opinion. Among these cases are State v. Superior Court, 143 Ariz. 45, 691
P.2d 1073 (1984) (en banc) (upholding DWI roadblock on fourth amendment challenge,
thereby minimizing the import of State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Court of State, 136
Ariz. 1, 663 P.2d 992 (1983) (en banc), in which excessive on-site police discretion and
a lack of evidence of the roadblock's superiority in apprehending drunk drivers led to a
finding of unconstitutionality); Jones v. State, 459 So. 2d 1068 (Fla. Ct. App. 1984) (DWI
roadblock unconstitutional due largely to inadequate factual record and, in particular,
lack of evidence of comparative effectiveness in apprehending drunk drivers); State v.
Golden, 171 Ga. App. 27, 318 S.E.2d 693 (1984) (driver's license checkpoint case; defend-
ant's motion to suppress sobriety evidence denied on appeal in light of minimal field
discretion, minimal delay, clear identification by signs as a police checkpoint); State v.
Cloukey, 486 A.2d 143 (Me. 1985) (driving on revoked license case; roadblock for traffic
safety check; roadblock constitutional despite only modest supervisory involvement in
advance planning stages); Little v. State, 300 Md. 485, 479 A.2d 903 (1984) (checkpoint
established both to detect and deter drunk driving; upheld on constitutional grounds based
on Deskins factors despite extremely dubious and equivocal statistical and anecdotal evidence
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state . . . presented absolutely no evidence regarding the availability of
less intrusive methods of law enforcement for combatting the drunk
driving problem."'" Similarly, the state, at the hearing on the defendant's
motion to suppress, offered no evidence "of the inadequacy of the
traditional method of enforcing DWI laws, nor of the superiority of
the roadblock method of identifying and apprehending drunk drivers.''19
Two questions are raised by the court's analysis on this point. First,
if it is legitimate to take judicial notice of the severity of the drunk
driving problem, is it also legitimate for the court simply to infer the
inadequacy of traditional methods from the magnitude and persistence
of the problem? 20 Probably so, but this is of limited help to the state's
case, since the superiority of the roadblock method in achieving any of
various possible purposes is clearly inapt for resolution by judicial notice. 2
for the superior detection and deterrence effect of the checkpoint program); People v.
Scott, 63 N.Y.2d 518, 473 N.E.2d 1, 483 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1984) (DWI roadblock upheld
despite rapid shifts in location; state required to show only a reasonable basis for an
asserted deterrence or detection effect and not required to separate out the incremental
deterrent effect of the roadblock from that of other components of the state's broader
effort against drunk driving); People v. Torres, 125 Misc. 2d 78, 478 N.Y.S.2d 771 (Crim.
Ct. 1984) (DWI roadblock permissible where established in non-arbitrary manner and
discernible need established; decided without benefit of court of appeals opinion in Scott);
State v. Smith, 674 P.2d 562 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984) (roadblock to detect license and
registration violations; dismissal of DWI charge affirmed based on absence of statutory
authority; exceptionally broad holding not apparently dependent upon any particular
remediable set of roadblock procedures); State v. Schroeder, 66 Or. App. 754, 675 P.2d
1111, petition for review denied, 296 Or. 648, 678 P.2d 1227 (1984) (en banc) (denial of
motion to suppress evidence affirmed; illuminating dissent to denial of petition for review
by former professor and now Justice Linde).
Thus, the differences not merely in result, but in the standards to be imposed upon
the state, are evident even in the state cases post-dating McLaughlin. In light of cases
such as Scott and Smith, it can easily be argued that the cases since McLaughlin have
polarized even further along crucial dimensions, and that Indiana must at some point
take a position on the key questions not reached in McLaughlin. It should be noted that
there is essentially no helpful prior Indiana authority, although the court in Irwin v. State,
178 Ind. App. 676, 681, 383 N.E.2d 1086, 1089 (1978), suggested in dicta that "no one
questions the right of law enforcement officers to establish a roadblock to conduct a
routine traffic check of all vehicles and drivers passing through that point during a given
period of time."
'471 N.E.2d at 1137.
'91d.
"This would not itself be an instance of judical notice, as judicial notice is typically
thought of in terms of fact, rather than evaluation of fact. See, e.g., Glover v. Ottinger,
400 N.E.2d 1212, 1214 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
2'Matters such as the detection or deterrence value, or the superiority of intoxication
roadblocks are subject to reasonable dispute. See H. Ross, DETERRING THE DRINKING
DRIVER 110 (1982). As such, they are to be established by evidence rather than judical
notice. See, e.g., Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 716, 433 P.2d 732, 747, 63
Cal. Rptr. 724, 739 (1967) (en banc).
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Second, it must be asked whether the court is in fact moving toward
simply assuming the adequacy of traditional means of detecting intox-
ication. The court observed that "[n]o doubt, police officers are well
trained to identify such indicators as weaving between lanes, failing to
signal a turn, speeding, etc." '2 2 The assumption that the police are capable
of non-intrusively detecting drunken drivers with some accuracy is cer-
tainly widely held. 23 This confidence, however, is probably misplaced. 24
No legal harm follows from any such false assumption, though, if
detection of drunk drivers is no easier at roadblocks than through
ordinary patrolling.25
The court in McLaughlin concluded its analysis of the second Brown
element by determining that a potential state interest in deterring, as
opposed to detecting, drunken driving was "not present in this case." 26
Certainly, the state made no substantial attempt to establish empirically
the magnitude of any deterrent effect. The court should, however, have
found the relative deterrent effect of the roadblock program in question
to have been unproven, rather than apparently assuming the deterrence
effect to be non-existent. While it is true that the police did not widely
publicize in advance the roadblock program's general features27 in order
22471 N.E.2d at 1137.
"See, e.g., State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Court of State, 136 Ariz. 1, 5, 663 P.2d
992, 996 (1983) (en banc); People v. Bartley, 125 111. App. 3d 575, 578, 466 N.E.2d 346,
348 (1984) ("[a]n intoxicated motorist can be easily discerned by a trained officer without
having to stop all traffic at a roadblock"), criticized, People v. Conway, 135 Ill. App.
3d 887, 482 N.E.2d 437 (1985), rev'd, People v. Bartley, No. 60593 (III. Nov. 21, 1985);
State v. Deskins, 234 Kan. 529, 545, 673 P.2d 1174, 1187 (1983) (Prager, J., dissenting);
State v. Cloukey, 486 A.2d 143, 147 (Me. 1985).2"See Grossman, Sobriety Checkpoints: Roadblocks to Fourth Amendment Protections,
12 AM. J. CRIM. L. 123, 159 n.199 (1984). See also id. at 158 (estimate that 7-8% of
those driving at night are legally intoxicated), & 162 (estimate that for every 2,000 trips
taken by drunk drivers, only one will result in single arrest). It is difficult to imagine
how the probability of arrest could be 0.00044 if signs of driving while intoxicated were
readily detectable by trained persons using non-intrusive means. See M. Ross, DETERRING
THE DRUNK DRIVER 107 (1982).
2See, e.g., State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Court of State, 136 Ariz. 1, 2, 663 P.2d
992, 993 (1983) (en banc) (5,763 vehicles stopped at roadblocks; 13 DWI arrests); State
v. Deskins, 234 Kan. 529, 545, 673 P.2d 1174, 1187 (1983) (between 2,000 and 3,000
vehicles stopped; 15 DWI arrests) (Prager, J., dissenting); People v. Scott, 63 N.Y.2d
518, 523, 528 n.3, 473 N.E.2d I, 2, 5 n.3, 483 N.Y.S.2d 649, 650, 653 n.3 (1984) (evidence
that ten percent of drivers intoxicated during prime weekend late evening hours, but
roadblocks conducted largely during these hours resulted in fewer than 1/10 of one percent
being arrested for DWI). The ratio was somewhat better in Jones v. State, 459 So. 2d
1068, 1079 (Fla. Ct. App. 1984), where five or six DWI arrests resulted from the roadblock
stop of between only 100 and 200 cars. This ratio was roughly matched by the particular
roadblock at issue in McLaughlin, where three DWI arrests resulted from the stopping
of 115 cars over the period of an hour. 471 N.E.2d at 1137.




to maximize deterrence, it is certainly conceivable that a series of "eight
to ten roadblocks in Tippecanoe County during September, 1982"28
would, without additional official publicity, generate at least a localized,
temporary deterrent effect based solely on word of mouth communication.
All that may be required for deterrence is the perceived possibility of
the roadblock's recurrence, not official advance notice. 29
The remainder of the dozen factors listed in Deskins were discussed,
finally, in connection with the third element of the Brown test, the
severity of the interference with the defendant's liberty caused by the
seizure in question.30 The court did not find this factor to be decisive.
The court found that
the objective intrusion on the detained motorists' fourth amend-
ment rights was relatively low; the subjective intrusion caused
by the physical characteristics of this roadblock was somewhat
higher, due to its isolated location, questionable lighting, and
absence of warning signs; and the perceived and actual discretion
left to the officers in the field was adequately controlled .... 31
It does seem clear that the presence or absence of these factors
should not be examined with equal degrees of scrutiny. There is, for
example, no excuse for failure to post illuminated warning signs indicating
the precise purpose of the impending stop. The cost in money, or in
detection or deterrence, is certainly minimal, and the benefit in reduced
driver anxiety is clearly significant.3 2
On the other hand, factors such as the most expeditious location
for the roadblock, or even the appropriate degree of lighting, should
be judicially reviewed only with great restraint, out of deference to the
professional and technical expertise of the police. The police have no
obvious incentives to locate the roadblock frivolously in unproductive
locations. They may well be confronted with a delicate tradeoff between
the productivity of the roadblock and the safety of all those concerned. 3
2"Id. at 1137 n.6.2 While advance notice of the precise time and place of roadblocks maximizes neither
apprehension nor deterrence, advance publicity of a more general nature may maximize
deterrence while resulting in a lesser reduction in apprehension. Some degree of tradeoff
betveen deterrence and apprehension may be inevitable, and the state should be wary of
designing a roadblock program in an effort to accomplish both purposes, lest it be unable
to demonstrate the superiority of roadblocks in either respect. See Jones v. State, 459
So. 2d 1068, 1076 (Fla. Ct. App. 1984).
3471 N.E.2d at 1138.
"Id. at 1141.
"The court in State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Court of State, 136 Ariz. I, 5, 663
P.2d 992, 996 (1983) (en banc) noted a lack of warning signs or advance flashing lights
and inferred an unnecessary degree of driver suprise.
"Safety is the seventh Deskins factor cited in McLaughlin, 471 N.E.2d at 1135, and
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Judicial attempts at second-guessing such determinations would seem
generally unnecessary. 34
The court in McLaughlin determined that the level of actual and
perceived operational discretion involved fell within acceptable limits
because the roadblock was conducted pursuant to "previously specified
neutral criteria" 35 and because "every car that arrived at the roadblock
site was stopped."13 6 The balance of the third Brown factor was thus
not itself adverse to the state. 37
However, the overall balance of the three factors in Brown dictated
the affirmance of the trial court order granting the defendant's motion
to suppress. The state in McLaughlin was held to have "failed to meet
its burden of proving the reasonableness of the warrantless seizure of
defendant .. "38 There was a fatal absence of evidence for the su-
periority, in terms of detection or deterrence, of the roadblock method. 9
The court concluded by warning in dicta that a showing by the state
of a deterrent effect of roadblocks generated by advance publicity should
take account of the possibility that a similar publicity blitz associated
with traditional procedures to detect and deter drunk drivers used in an
intensified manner would be equally productive. 4°
a concern for safety may account for any "isolation" of the roadblock, as found in id.
at 1141.
"4The Supreme Court has said in a somewhat different context that "[wle may
assume that .. .officials will be unlikely to locate a checkpoint where it bears arbitrarily
or oppressively on motorists as a class." United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543,
559 (1976).
"1471 N.E.2d at 1141 n.8, in accordance with Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,
662 (1979).
36471 N.E.2d at 1139. A number of the cases involve what could easily appear to
be arbitrary selection from the driver's standpoint, such as stopping every third or fifth
car, or allowing enough cars to pass to avoid undue congestion, but such practices are
generally not condemned. See, e.g., People v. Scott, 63 N.Y.2d 518, 526, 473 N.E.2d 1,
4, 483 N.Y.S.2d 649, 652 (1984) (citing authority).
"It should be noted that the courts often further subdivide their inquiry into the
subjective intrusiveness of the roadblock by considering such questions, inspired by Mar-
tinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 558, as whether the driver could "see visible signs of the officers'
authority." See McLaughlin, 471 N.E.2d at 1139. See also State v. Golden, 171 Ga. App.
27, 29, 318 S.E.2d 693, 695 (1984); People v. Torres, 125 Misc. 2d 78, 82, 478 N.Y.S.2d
771, 774 (Crim. Ct. 1984). Until police roadblocks are conducted in unmarked police
vehicles, or unauthorized highway brigandage becomes more prominent, this factor may
safely be dropped from consideration.
1"471 N.E.2d at 1141. See also State v. Goins, 16 Ohio App. 3d 168, 172, 474
N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (1984) (inquiry into police "reasonableness" under all of the circum-
stances of the checkpoint).
"471 N.E.2d at 1141.
"11d. at 1142. It is not settled whether a proper balancing would compare the effects
of a roadblock program against those of a particularly "concentrated effort" using
traditional techniques. Presumably, no roadblock will be as effective as the police's ignoring
all other tasks, but using only traditional means, to detect drunk drivers.
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In view of the state's failure to adduce any evidence on the question
of the relative efficacy of roadblocks, or to advance any public interest
other than detection and apprehension, it is clear that McLaughlin raises
far more questions than it answers.
Crucial questions, such as the kinds of evidence that are acceptable,
and the nature of the weighing process involved in passing on questions
of relative effectiveness, remain unanswered. It is unclear how the courts
will react to masses of conflicting statistical data, and how they will
review trial court findings on such potentially complex empirical ques-
tions.
As the perceived difficulty of evaluating the statistical evidence of
the relative efficacy of roadblock detentions threatens to become un-
manageable, though, the courts are under greater pressure simply to cut,
rather than painstakingly unravel, the Gordian knot of statistical evidence.
The First District of the Indiana Court of Appeals has recently taken
just this tack, disagreeing with McLaughlin, in State v. Garcia.41
In Garcia, the court of appeals reversed the trial court's granting
of the defendant driver's motion to suppress evidence of his driving
while intoxicated where the evidence was obtained through a procedurally
well-conducted temporary roadblock. 42 Most of the numerous Deskins
factors43 were found favorably to the state, and during the two-hour
operation of the roadblock, the stopping of approximately 100 vehicles
netted seven DWI arrests. 44
The essential difference between Garcia and McLaughlin is the un-
willingness of the Garcia court to consider the relative efficacy of the
roadblock in question as contrasted with more traditional and less in-
trusive means of enforcing drunk driving laws. 45
The court in Garcia was concerned largely with the presence or
absence of "unbridled discretion and standardless conduct of an officer
in the field ' 46 and saw the crucial constitutional task as simply one of
striking "a balance between the public interest in highway safety, which
includes ridding the roads of drunk drivers, and the individual's right
to personal security from arbitrary interference by law officers. '47
What the court in Garcia did not acknowledge is that the concern
for "the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest" in
C481 N.E.2d 148 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985).
42 d. at 154. The roadblock in Garcia may have had better advance general publicity
than that involved in McLaughlin, cf. supra note 27 and accompanying text, but the court
in Garcia did not rest its analysis on this distinction.
"4See 481 N.E.2d at 152-53 in the context of supra note 7 and accompanying text.
"Id. at 150.





reduced highway carnage derives ultimately from the language of the
United States Supreme Courts4 and that a fair reading of this requirement
leaves the limitation of police arbitrariness and discretion as a "central,"
but not exclusive, concern.49
No one denies that roadblock procedures are more intrusive than
traditional procedures under which a driver whose conduct gives no
grounds for reasonable articulable individualized suspicion may generally
proceed unmolested by the authorities. The concern of the McLaughlin
court, as opposed to the Garcia court, is that this greater intrusiveness
on fundamental individual constitutional rights be counterbalanced by
a showing that the roadblock in question has some compensating ad-
vantage. The logic of McLaughlin in interpreting Brown is that there
is no point in countenancing exceptionally burdensome law enforcement
techniques if those techniques are no more efficacious, or even less
efficacious, than less burdensome techniques.
Defenders of the Garcia approach can offer several reasonable re-
sponses in addition to noting the potential difficulties inherent in having
the courts grapple with competing statistical analyses. There is undoubt-
edly a distinction that should be respected between dictating police
techniques and dictating constitutional limitations on police techniques.50
It is also possible to argue that the "obvious failure of the so-called
traditional methods"'" should give rise to some presumption that alter-
native techniques, including roadblocks, will be more effective. A plea
for time to develop adequate statistics for comparative purposes can be
made, 2 although this controversially assumes that the welter of currently
available statistics is legally inadequate to settle the issue, even tem-
porarily, until better statistics can be developed to resolve the empirical
questions more definitively.
What should clearly be resisted, though, is any temptation to eyeball
the number of arrests per hour, 3 or even per officer per hour, or the
phenomenon of drivers' avoiding the roadblock by turning around,' 4
and assume that superior deterrence has been shown or that it can be
inferred that the McLaughlin approach results in unnecessary highway
tragedies."
'Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979). It is unclear how roadblocks would
advance the public interest at all if it were to be conceded that they were less effective
than equally intense use of traditional techniques.
"Id. at 51.








The ultimate criticism of the Garcia approach remains that it imposes
obvious costs in civil liberties without any assurance of compensations
in increased public safety. The issue is not the magnitude or difficulty
of the drunk driving problem, but the avoidance of incurring potentially
pointless losses of basic civil liberties. The Indiana Supreme Court may
eventually adopt the Garcia approach based on practical considerations.
This Article, however, will not assume so, as this would be a virtually
unique instance of applying what amounts to merely a due process"rational basis" test with respect to the substantial burdening of fun-
damental rights and civil liberties.16
It is sometimes suggested that either the legislature or the attorney
general should promulgate uniform roadblock operational standards."
The value of this step is unclear, given the unsettled state of Indiana
law in this regard. The thirteen factors enumerated in Deskins provide
some guidance." Adherence to statutory or administrative guidelines
would not guarantee constitutionality, and departure from the guidelines
would not necessarily result in an unconstitutional seizure.
In the absence of decisive, methodologically unimpeachable, uncon-
tradicted, and plainly applicable controlled studies, it is also unclear
whether the state should abandon its detection and apprehension rationale
and focus instead on building a technically sound case for the relative
deterrence value, at least over the short term,5 9 of its roadblock program.
While the cases do not permit a rigorous comparison of the cost-
effectiveness of roadblocks and of routine patrolling, the productivity
in terms of detection and apprehension per police officer-hour of road-
blocks may well not exceed that of conscientious routine patrolling, other
things being equal. 6'
This is not to suggest that the unique deterrence value of roadblocks
is easy to establish, although some courts have been satisfied in this
regard. 61 Indiana has not yet determined how deeply the courts will
16This is, of course, not to suggest that there is no authoritative support for the
Garcia approach in this particular area. One of the most recent such cases is State v.
Martin, 496 A.2d 442 (Vt. 1985), in which the Vermont Supreme Court simply assumed
some level of deterrence attributable to the roadblock, and seemed disinclined to require
any sort of a showing of any greater deterrence flowing from the roadblock technique
than from less intrusive techniques. Id. at 447-48.
"See, e.g., State v. Deskins, 234 Kan. 529, 543, 673 P.2d 1174, 1185-86 (1983);
Commonwealth v. McGeoghegan, 389 Mass. 137, 449 N.E.2d 349, 353 (1983).
'"Deskins, 234 Kan. at 541, 673 P.2d at 1185.
"For a variety of drunk driver programs, longterm effects have been hard to
demonstrate. See M. Ross, DETERRING THE DRUNK DRIVER 103 (1982).
w'See the examples cited at supra note 25.
"See, e.g., State v. Superior Court, 143 Ariz. 45, 48, 691 P.2d 1073, 1076 (1984);
Little v. State, 300 Md. 485, 504, 479 A.2d 903, 913 (1984). The dissenting opinion in
Little is cogently argued in this regard.
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plunge into the task of sifting out methodologically flawed statistical
studies from the welter of inconsistent claims.
Even such preliminary tasks as determining whether a study from
another time and jurisdiction should be accorded substantial weight as
evidence of a deterrent effect of an Indiana program present formidable
difficulties. Just as the courts may wish to discourage litigation based
on only minimal departures from an optimally conducted roadblock, so
they may wish to avoid having every roadblock case turn into a battle
of statisticians. From this standpoint, it is tempting to adopt New York's"reasonable basis" test, 62 rather than rigorously pursuing the difficult
question of the roadblock's identifiable deterrence value.
The temptation to simplify the inquiry by moving closer to a min-
imum scrutiny equal protection or substantive due process standard63
should be resisted. In roadblock cases, it should be recalled that the
state is ultimately seeking to impose a criminal sanction and to engage
in procedures which specially burden the privacy and travel rights of
numerous innocent drivers. 64 It is doubtful that such an intrusion should
be permitted merely because there is a "reasonable basis ' 65 for believing
that there is some practical reason for doing so.
Unfortunately, the process of avoiding extreme and obviously flawed
solutions may not help the courts to crystallize a uniquely justifiable
moderate approach. A moderate standard, though, should include judicial
deference to most limited departures from allegedly optimal roadblock
procedures. 66 Beyond this obvious step to discourage undue litigation,
the decisions could reasonably take various directions.
One approach to the knotty problem of duly weighing conflicting
statistical evidence on the claimed superior deterrence effect of roadblock
programs would start by generally admitting into evidence otherwise
competent studies from jurisdictions other than Indiana. 67 Methodological
criticisms of such studies should generally go to their evidentiary weight,
and not to their admissibility. 68 Techniques should be devised to minimize
"2See People v. Scott, 63 N.Y.2d 518, 529, 473 N.E.2d 1, 6, 483 N.Y.S.2d 649, 654
(1984).
"See, e.g., Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911); Linde,
Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197, 201 (1976); Note, Legislative Purpose,
Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123, 124-25 (1972).
"'See generally Grossman, Sobriety Checkpoints: Roadblocks to Fourth Amendment
Protections, 12 AM. J. CRIM. L. 123 (1984). See also State v. Schroeder, 296 Or. 648,
649, 678 P.2d 1227, 1228 (1984) (Linde, J., dissenting to denial of petiton for review).
"1See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
"See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
"National, as opposed to exclusively New York-based, statistics were apparently
examined and relied on for at least limited purposes in People v. Scott, 63 N.Y.2d 518,
526-27, 473 N.E.2d 1, 4, 483 N.Y.S.2d 649, 652 (1984).
"See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §§ 208, 209 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984). For a general
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any necessity for continually relitigating the validity of leading studies
as roadblock cases continue to arise nationally.
The critical superior deterrence effect issue might best be resolved
through the following judicial standard: if the statistical evidence as to
the alleged detection or deterrence superiority of intoxication roadblocks
remains substantially irreconcilable, conflicting, or inconclusive after full
opportunity for cross-examination and adversary commentary, or if the
state's own evidence by itself is judicially deemed to be unduly im-
pressionistic, anecdotal, or materially deficient, the state has not dis-
charged its burden of justifying the special intrusiveness of the intoxication
roadblock. 69 One can only hope that additional empirical studies will
simplify, rather than further complicate, the question.
introduction to some of the statistical techniques relevant to adjudicating claims of de-
terrence value, see Fisher, Multiple Regression in Legal Proceedings, 80 COLUM. L. REv.
702 (1980). While competent statistical analysis cannot by itself resolve the underlying
issues of public policy, MCCORMICK, supra at 646 ("Deciding what level of confidence
is appropriate in a particular case . . . is a policy question and not a statistical issue"),
some courts in other contexts are beginning to insist upon statistical methodologies more
sophisticated than those commonly employed thus far in roadblock cases. See, e.g., Moultrie
v. Martin, 690 F.2d 1078, 1082 (4th Cir. 1982) ("in all cases involving racial discrimination,
the courts of this circuit must apply a standard deviation analysis ... before drawing
conclusions from statistical comparisons"). Of course, it is possible that roadblocks either
invariably or never have superior apprehension or deterrence effects, where no such firmly
established broad principle can be applied in individual racial discrimination cases.
9The point is in part to control the demands on judicial technical expertise while
avoiding merely speculative or intuitive conclusions on the relative effectiveness of the
roadblocks.

